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Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Choi, Jay Pil & Gerlach, Heiko, 2019. "Optimal cross-licensing arrangements: Collusion versus entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
  2. Dan Kovenock & Suddhasatwa Roy, 2005. "Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 119-137, July.
  3. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why," UCLA Economics Working Papers 456, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Pauline Affeldt & Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Joanna Piechucka, 2021. "Market Concentration in Europe: Evidence from Antitrust Markets," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1930, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  5. Patrice CASSAGNARD & Pierre REGIBEAU, 2018. "Collective Entry Deterrence and Free Riding: Airbus and Boeing in China," Working Papers 2017-2018_11, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Jul 2018.
  6. Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor, 2018. "Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 250-273.
  7. Bet, Germán, 2021. "Product specification under a threat of entry: Evidence from Airlines’ departure times," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  8. Michael Waldman, 1988. "The Simple Case of Entry Deterrence Reconsidered," UCLA Economics Working Papers 517, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2007. "Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 31-40, October.
  10. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1381-1388, November.
  11. Melkonyan, Tigran A., 2006. "Value of reputation in the chain-store game with multiple incumbents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 425-448, March.
  12. Dimitrios Varvarigos & Eleni Stathopoulou, 2023. "On the relation between corruption and market competition," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 99-121, January.
  13. V Ghosal, 2004. "Pre-Emptive Investment Behaviour and Industry Structure," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 9(1), pages 47-68, March.
  14. Michael Conlin & Vrinda Kadiyali, 2006. "Entry‐Deterring Capacity in the Texas Lodging Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 167-185, March.
  15. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1991. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 155-172, Summer.
  16. Polasky, Stephen & Mason, Charles F., 1998. "On the welfare effects of mergers: Short run vs. long run," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-24.
  17. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2017. "Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 86-102.
  18. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2003. "Firm Location Choice in the Presence of a Free Rider Problem," Working Papers 2003_6, York University, Department of Economics.
  19. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 371-396, June.
  20. Creane, Anthony & Miyagiwa, Kaz, 2009. "Forgoing invention to deter entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 632-638, September.
  21. Patrice Cassagnard & Pierre Regibeau, 2018. "Collective Entry Deterrence and Free Riding: Airbus and Boeing in China," Working Papers hal-02141056, HAL.
  22. Argenton, Cédric, 2019. "Colluding on excluding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 194-206.
  23. Lalit Manral, 2010. "Demand competition and investment heterogeneity in industries based on systemic technologies: evidence from the US long-distance telecommunications services industry, 1984–1996," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(5), pages 765-802, October.
  24. Ju Biung-Ghi & Yoo Seung Han, 2022. "Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 199-231, January.
  25. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.
  26. Patrice Cassagnard & Pierre Regibeau, 2018. "Collective Entry Deterrence and Free Riding: Airbus and Boeing in China," Working papers of CATT hal-02141056, HAL.
  27. Ikuo Ishibashi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2006. "Inviting entrants may help incumbent firms," Discussion Papers 2006-46, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
  28. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2017. "Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 102-117.
  29. Gopal Das Varma & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2010. "Non‐Cooperative Entry Deterrence In License Auctions: Dynamic Versus Sealed Bid," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 450-476, June.
  30. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  31. Gopal Varma & Martino Stefano, 2022. "Entry Deterrence, Concentration, and Merger Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(2), pages 199-222, September.
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