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Caring About Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Solution to Holdup Problems with Small Stakes

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Team Incentives under Relative Performance Evaluation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 187-206, March.
  2. Buchheit, Steve & Feltovich, Nick, 2010. "Experimental evidence of a sunk–cost paradox: a study of pricing behavior in Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-124, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  3. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 57, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2011. "Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 18, pages 1591-1696, Elsevier.
  5. Mukesh Eswaran & Hugh M. Neary, 2016. "The Evolutionary Logic Of Honoring Sunk Costs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 835-846, April.
  6. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2004. "Pretrial settlement with fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 287-296, July.
  7. Wang, Weifang, 2021. "Nuanced insights into land buyer perceptions of engaging in rural land transactions from a cost perspective: Evidence from China’s emerging rural land market," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  8. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley Macleod, 2006. "Welfare Economics with Intransitive Revealed Preferences: A Theory of the Endowment Effect," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 193-218, May.
  9. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
  10. Dawid, Herbert & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2008. "Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 26-52, January.
  11. R. Preston Mcafee & Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, 2010. "Do Sunk Costs Matter?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 323-336, April.
  12. Foss, Nicolai J., 2003. "Bounded rationality in the economics of organization: "Much cited and little used"," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 245-264, April.
  13. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5qv060md, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  14. Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2012. "Contract Form, Wage Flexibility, and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 526-531, May.
  15. Edward P. Lazear, 2009. "Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 914-940, October.
  16. Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garrett Milam & Bernardo Huberman, 2007. "Searching for the sunk cost fallacy," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 79-104, March.
  17. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2013. "Contracting Without a Plan: A Theory of Informal Justice," Working Papers 1456, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  18. Oxoby, Robert J. & Spraggon, John, 2008. "Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 703-713, March.
  19. Eric A. Verhoogen & Stephen V. Burks & Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2007. "Fairness and Freight-Handlers: Local Labor Market Conditions and Wage-Fairness Perceptions in a Trucking Firm," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(4), pages 477-498, July.
  20. Chassang, Sylvain & Zehnder, Christian, 2016. "Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
  21. Ho, Shirley J. & Tsai, Yi Hao, 2020. "Building friendship with Boss: Strategic prosocial behaviors in the agency model," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  22. Robert Evans, 2008. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 459-491, May.
  23. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3f2509gz, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  24. Raghabendra Pratap KC & Dominique Olié Lauga & Vincent Mak, 2023. "Hold-up induced by demand for fairness: theory and experimental evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(4), pages 721-750, May.
  25. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers in Economics 518, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  26. Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2016. "Team Incentives and Reference‐Dependent Preferences," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 958-989, December.
  27. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold‐up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
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