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Games with Espionage

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Johnston, Iain G., 2022. "Optimal strategies in the fighting fantasy gaming system: Influencing stochastic dynamics by gambling with limited resource," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(3), pages 1272-1281.
  2. Tao Wang, 2020. "Competitive Intelligence and Disclosure of Cost Information in Duopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(3), pages 665-699, November.
  3. Jonas Send, 2021. "Contest Copycats: Adversarial Duplication of Effort in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  4. Shirley Ho, 2007. "An Economic Analysis Of Military Intelligence," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(6), pages 485-493.
  5. Po-Lu Chen, 2016. "Cross-Country Economic Espionage and Investment in Research and Development," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(4), pages 146-155, April.
  6. Daniel Garcia & Maarten C. W. Janssen & Radostina Shopova, 2023. "Dynamic Pricing with Uncertain Capacities," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(9), pages 5275-5297, September.
  7. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023. "Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(2), pages 255-275, October.
  8. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 141-150.
  9. Hans Reijnierse & Peter Borm & Mark Voorneveld, 2007. "On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 539-560, March.
  10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:18:p:1-4 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Van Gorder, Robert A. & Caputo, Michael R., 2010. "Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 1123-1139, June.
  12. Florian Gauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2020. "Cognitive Empathy In Conflict Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1659-1678, November.
  13. Lee, Natalie, 2023. "Feigning ignorance for long-term gains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 42-71.
  14. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023. "Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 775-804, September.
  15. Barrachina, Alex & Tauman, Yair & Urbano, Amparo, 2014. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 127-146.
  16. Valerio Capraro & Joseph Y Halpern, 2019. "Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(4), pages 371-408, November.
  17. Kathryn Merrick & Medria Hardhienata & Kamran Shafi & Jiankun Hu, 2016. "A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-29, July.
  18. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2015. "Stable Observable Behavior," MPRA Paper 63013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. D. Thorleuchter & D. Van Den Poel, 2012. "Protecting Research and Technology from Espionage," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 12/824, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  20. Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2022. "Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: Who benefits and is it stable?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
  21. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2019. "Induced Price Leadership and (Counter-)Spying Rivals' Play under Incomplete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 7476, CESifo.
  22. repec:grz:wpaper:2016-02 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. S. Ho, 2008. "Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 31-58, February.
  24. Tommaso Denti & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2022. "Experimental Cost of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(9), pages 3106-3123, September.
  25. Joseph Y. Halpern & Rafael Pass, 2018. "Game theory with translucent players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 949-976, September.
  26. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2025. "Know thy enemy: Information acquisition in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
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