On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games
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- Reijnierse, J.H. & Borm, P.E.M. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "On 'informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games," Other publications TiSEM 376a74e3-b40b-4fcb-a277-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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KeywordsBimatrix game; Equilibrium selection; Leakage of information; C72;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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