IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Taxes, Fringe Benefits and Faculty"

by Daniel S. Hamermesh & Stephen A. Woodbury

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: evidence from Russian firms," Working Papers w0062, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Jonathan Gruber & James Poterba, 1995. "Tax Subsidies to Employer-Provided Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 5147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Burkhauser, Richard V. & Feng, Shuaizhang & Jenkins, Stephen P. & Larrimore, Jeff, 2009. "Recent Trends in Top Income Shares in the USA: Reconciling Estimates from March CPS and IRS Tax Return Data," IZA Discussion Papers 4426, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Jonathan Gruber, 2002. "Taxes and Health Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 16, pages 37-66 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1993. "Is Health Insurance Crippling the Labor Market?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_97, Levy Economics Institute.
  6. Leslie E. Papke, 1995. "Participation in and Contributions to 401(k) Pension Plans: Evidence from Plan Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 30(2), pages 311-325.
  7. Sewell, David, 1997. "Shifting responsibility for social services as enterprises privatize in Belarus," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1719, The World Bank.
  8. Gruber, Jonathan & Lettau, Michael, 2004. "How elastic is the firm's demand for health insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1273-1293, July.
  9. William M. Gentry & Eric Peress, 1994. "Taxes and Fringe Benefits Offered by Employers," NBER Working Papers 4764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Gruber, Jonathan & Poterba, James, 1994. "Tax Incentives and the Decision to Purchase Health Insurance: Evidence from the Self-Employed," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 701-33, August.
  11. Power, Laura & Rider, Mark, 2002. "The effect of tax-based savings incentives on the self-employed," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 33-52, July.
  12. Harley Frazis & Mark A. Loewenstein, 2009. "How Responsive are Quits to Benefits?," Working Papers 426, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  13. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2012. "Non‐wage benefits, costs of turnover and labour attachment," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 20(1), pages 113-136, 01.
  14. Melissa A. Thomasson, 2003. "The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S. Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1373-1384, September.
  15. Jonathan Gruber & Michael Lettau, 2000. "How Elastic is the Firm's Demand for Health Insurance?," NBER Working Papers 8021, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, . "Job-Lock: An Impediment to Labor Mobility? Is Health Insurance Crippling the Labor Market?," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive 10, Levy Economics Institute.
  17. Voßmerbäumer, Jan & Wagner, Franz W., 2013. "Steuerwirkungen betrieblicher Entgeltpolitik," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 144, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.