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Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini, 2024. "Global Public Good Agreements with Fixed Costs," Graz Economics Papers 2024-18, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  2. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini, 2025. "On the credibility of threats to avoid the deployment of solar geoengineering," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 27(1), pages 1-21, January.
  3. Stefano Carattini & Simon Levin & Alessandro Tavoni, 2019. "Cooperation in the Climate Commons," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(2), pages 227-247.
  4. Jan Kersting & Vicki Duscha & Matthias Weitzel, 2017. "Cooperation on Climate Change under Economic Linkages: How the Inclusion of Macroeconomic Effects Affects Stability of a Global Climate Coalition," The Energy Journal, , vol. 38(4), pages 19-42, July.
  5. Okada, Akira, 2023. "A dynamic climate negotiation game achieving full cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 657-669.
  6. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2017. "International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 312-320.
  7. Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2024. "The Stackelberg vs. Nash-Cournot Folk-theorem in international environmental agreements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
  8. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini & Anna Viktoria Rohrer, 2021. "International Environmental Agreements and the Paradox of Cooperation: Revisiting and Generalizing Some Previous Results," Graz Economics Papers 2021-05, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  9. Michael Finus, 2024. "A Mechanism for Addressing Compliance and Participation in Global Public Good Treaties: A Comment," Graz Economics Papers 2024-14, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  10. Tibor Besedeš & Erik P. Johnson & Xinping Tian, 2020. "Economic determinants of multilateral environmental agreements," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 832-864, August.
  11. Christian Feige & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Jan Krämer, 2018. "Climate Negotiations in the Lab: A Threshold Public Goods Game with Heterogeneous Contributions Costs and Non-binding Voting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 343-362, June.
  12. Xinyue Wang & Tai-Liang Chen, 2026. "The impact of abatement technology difference on optimal allowance trading scheme under the stability of international environmental agreement," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 8967-8993, April.
  13. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2015. "Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics–In Honour of Alfred Endres," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 657-664, December.
  14. Carattini, Stefano & Fankhauser, Sam & Gao, Jianjian & Gennaioli, Caterina & Panzarasa, Pietro, 2023. "What does network analysis teach us about international environmental cooperation?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  15. Hans Gersbach & Quirin Oberpriller & Martin Scheffel, 2019. "Double Free-Riding in Innovation and Abatement: A Rules Treaty Solution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(2), pages 449-483, June.
  16. Anna A. Klis, 2019. "Identity and equal treatment in negative externality agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 615-630, December.
  17. Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023. "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 419-438, June.
  18. Bekkers, Eddy & Cariola, Gianmarco, 2022. "Comparing different approaches to tackle the challenges of global carbon pricing," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2022-10, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
  19. Jo, Ara & Carattini, Stefano, 2021. "Trust and CO2 emissions: Cooperation on a global scale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 922-937.
  20. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2018. "International environmental agreements between asymmetric countries: A repeated game analysis," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 38-44.
  21. Marco Vincenzi, 2023. "Mapping the empirical relationship between environmental performance and social preferences: Evidence from macro data," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2023(1), pages 85-102.
  22. Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2024. "Barrett's paradox of cooperation: A full analytical proof 30 years after," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
  23. repec:aen:journl:ej38-4-kersting is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Nyborg, Karine, 2018. "Reciprocal climate negotiators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 707-725.
  25. Minna Havukainen & Mirja Mikkilä & Helena Kahiluoto, 2022. "Climate Policy Reform in Nepal through the Lenses of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(12), pages 1-21, June.
  26. Günther, Michael & Hellmann, Tim, 2017. "International environmental agreements for local and global pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 38-58.
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