Test Design Under Falsification

Citations

Cited by:

1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
   • Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
2. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
3. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
   • Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
   • Laura Doval & Alexey Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Post-Print hal-04865537, HAL.
   • Doval, Laura & Smolin, Alex, 2023. "Persuasion and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 18104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
4. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   • Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Information Acquisition Towards Unanimous Consent," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
6. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020. "Buyer-optimal extensionproof information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
   • Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser, 2018. "Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_034, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
7. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
   • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2024. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
8. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
   • Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
9. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
10. Paul Duetting & Michal Feldman & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2024. "Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey," Papers 2412.16384, arXiv.org.
11. Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2022. "Improving Information from Manipulable Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 79-115.
    • Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2019. "Improving Information from Manipulable Data," Papers 1908.10330, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
12. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
13. Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2025. "Persuaded Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(10), pages 3167-3207.
    • Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023. "Persuaded Search," Papers 2303.13409, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
14. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
15. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L., 0. "Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
16. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
17. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    • Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.
    • Garrett, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118115, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
18. Redlicki, Bartosz & Redlicki, Jakub, 2022. "Communication with Costly and Detectable Falsification," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 452-470.
19. Georgy Lukyanov & Samuel Safaryan, 2025. "Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking," Papers 2508.19682, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
20. Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2023. "Screening Signal-Manipulating Agents via Contests," Papers 2302.09168, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
21. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
22. Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Carlos Oyarzun, 2024. "Testing under information manipulation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 849-890, May.
23. Yi Liu & Yang Yu, 2024. "Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication," Papers 2411.19431, arXiv.org.
24. Luo, Zhaotian & Rozenas, Arturas, 2025. "Lying in persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 93-112.
25. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
26. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.