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Test Design Under Falsification

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
  2. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  3. Paul Duetting & Michal Feldman & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2024. "Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey," Papers 2412.16384, arXiv.org.
  4. Kreutzkamp, Sophie & Lou, Yichuan, 2025. "Persuasion without ex-post commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
  5. Yi Liu & Yang Yu, 2024. "Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication," Papers 2411.19431, arXiv.org.
  6. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  7. Redlicki, Bartosz & Redlicki, Jakub, 2022. "Communication with Costly and Detectable Falsification," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 452-470.
  8. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  10. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020. "Buyer-optimal extensionproof information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  11. Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2022. "Improving Information from Manipulable Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 79-115.
  12. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  13. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  14. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
  15. Georgy Lukyanov & Samuel Safaryan, 2025. "Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking," Papers 2508.19682, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
  16. Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2023. "Screening Signal-Manipulating Agents via Contests," Papers 2302.09168, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  17. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
  18. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  19. Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2025. "Persuaded Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(10), pages 3167-3207.
    • Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023. "Persuaded Search," Papers 2303.13409, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  20. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  21. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
  22. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  23. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L., 2026. "Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), January.
  24. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Carlos Oyarzun, 2024. "Testing under information manipulation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 849-890, May.
  26. Luo, Zhaotian & Rozenas, Arturas, 2025. "Lying in persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 93-112.
  27. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
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