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The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Yu Chen, 2013. "Bilateral Mechanism Design: Practical Contracting in Multi-Agency," CAEPR Working Papers 2013-003, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
  2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5371 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Thiele, Henrik & Wambach, Achim, 1999. "Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 247-260, December.
  4. Xie, Jia, 2011. "Ranking of signals in multitask agency models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 82-84, July.
  5. Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
  6. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," CAEPR Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
  7. Bender, Klaus & Richter, Andreas, 2002. "Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der RĆ¼ckversicherung," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 9, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
  8. Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023. "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 375-416, August.
  9. Niousha Shahidi, 2014. "Moral hazard and optimal insurance contract with a continuum effort," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1350-1360.
  10. Jewitt, Ian & Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2008. "Moral hazard with bounded payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 59-82, November.
  11. Page, F H, Jr, 1991. "Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(4), pages 323-338, October.
  12. Bond, Philip & Gomes, Armando, 2009. "Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 175-211, January.
  13. Jia Xie, 2015. "Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems," Staff Working Papers 15-7, Bank of Canada.
  14. Ohad Kadan & Philip J. Reny & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2017. "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principalā€Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 769-823, May.
  15. Jorge Aseff & Manuel Santos, 2005. "Stock options and managerial optimal contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 813-837, November.
  16. Carlier, G. & Dana, R.-A., 2005. "Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 826-843, November.
  17. Chang Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2022. "A Dual Approach To Agency Problems: Existence," Working papers 2022rwp-197, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  18. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2017. "Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions," Graz Economics Papers 2017-07, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  19. Roger, Guillaume, 2016. "Participation in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 10-24.
  20. Jia Xie, 2017. "Information, Risk Sharing, And Incentives In Agency Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(1), pages 157-182, February.
  21. Chi, Chang Koo & Choi, Kyoung Jin, 2023. "A dual approach to agency problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  22. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Jessica Martin, 2020. "The Risk-Sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model," Working Papers hal-02566942, HAL.
  24. Daniel Krv{s}ek & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Randomisation with moral hazard: a path to existence of optimal contracts," Papers 2311.13278, arXiv.org.
  25. Jessica Martin, 2021. "The Risk-Sharing Problem Under Limited Liability Constraints in a Single-Period Model," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 854-872, June.
  26. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2020. "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1023-1047, June.
  27. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Supplement to "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model"," MPRA Paper 37717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
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