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Optimal Selling Procedures with Fixed Costs

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Barbieri Stefano & Malueg David A., 2010. "Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
  2. Nicholas C Bedard & Jacob K Goeree & Ningyi Sun, 2023. "Multivariate Majorization in Principal-Agents Models," Papers 2308.13804, arXiv.org.
  3. Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10081, CESifo.
  4. Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019. "Optimal crowdfunding design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  5. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022. "To sell public or private goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 385-415, September.
  6. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
  7. Jen Shang & Rachel Croson, 2009. "A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1422-1439, October.
  8. Roland Strausz, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1430-1476, June.
  9. Marco Sahm, 2020. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(4), pages 909-933, December.
  10. Isabelle Brocas, 2008. "Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 283-304, March.
  11. Gilles Chemla & Katrin Tinn, 2020. "Learning Through Crowdfunding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1783-1801, May.
  12. Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Maria Virtudes Alba-Fernández & Cristina Martínez-Gómez, 2021. "Attracting the Right Crowd under Asymmetric Information: A Game Theory Application to Rewards-Based Crowdfunding," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(21), pages 1-23, October.
  13. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K. & Temimi, Akram, 2001. "Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 493-514, July.
  14. Andrea Buraschi & Francesca Cornelli, 2014. "The Economics of Donations and Enlightened Self†interest," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, January.
  15. Qiang Liu & Xiaofeng Liu & Subramanian Balachander, 2021. "Crowdfunding Project Design: Optimal Product Menu and Funding Target," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(10), pages 3800-3811, October.
  16. Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10081, CESifo.
  17. Rustam Ibragimov, 2004. "Shifting paradigms: on the robustness of economic models to heavy-tailedness assumptions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 105, Econometric Society.
  18. Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2014. "Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 372-400, June.
  19. Marco Sahm, 2015. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," CESifo Working Paper Series 5560, CESifo.
  20. Ke-Wei Huang & Arun Sundararajan, 2011. "Pricing Digital Goods: Discontinuous Costs and Shared Infrastructure," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 721-738, December.
  21. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 441-466, March.
  22. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
  23. Birulin, Oleksii, 2006. "Public goods with congestion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 289-299, July.
  24. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  25. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org.
  26. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 2, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  27. Ma, Xuejing & Wang, Zetao & Liu, Hongju, 2022. "Do long-life customers pay more in pay-what-you-want pricing? Evidence from live streaming," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 998-1009.
  28. Sahm, Marco, 2015. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113122, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  29. ParimalKanti Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 60-91, January.
  30. Sahm, Marco, 2016. "Advance-purchase financing of projects with few buyers," BERG Working Paper Series 118, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
  31. Cornelli, Francesca & Buraschi, Andrea, 2002. "Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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