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Citations for "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information"

by Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Deneckere, Raymond J.

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  1. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 137, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice," Papers of Peter Cramton 91beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  4. Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 69, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri, 2010. "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1760, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1993. "Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game," Working Papers 876, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 231-249, 07.
  9. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, September.
  10. Bos, Dieter, 1999. "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 353-371, September.
  11. Thomas A. Gresik & Eric W. Bond, 2004. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 42, Econometric Society.
  12. Schweinzer, Paul, 2010. "Sequential bargaining with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 109-121, January.
  13. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
  14. Boes, Dieter, "undated". "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Discussion Paper Serie A 593, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Apr 1999.
  15. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  16. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
  17. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
  18. Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton 95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  19. Besanko, David & Tong, Jian & Wu, Jianjun, 2016. "Dynamic game under ambiguity: the sequential bargaining example, and a new "coase conjecture"," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1606, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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