IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jetheo/v48y1989i1p18-46.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 137, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Alan, 1991. "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, pages 27-53.
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, April.
  4. Boom, Anette, 2004. ""Download for Free": When do providers of digital goods offer free samples?," Discussion Papers 2004/28, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  5. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Helmut Bester, "undated". "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Papers 027, Departmental Working Papers.
  7. Gerardi, Dino & Hörner, Johannes & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "The role of commitment in bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 578-603.
  8. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1997. "Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 425-437.
  9. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, pages 231-249.
  10. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, September.
  11. Bos, Dieter, 1999. "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 353-371.
  12. Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 2011. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, pages 887-924.
  13. Schweinzer, Paul, 2010. "Sequential bargaining with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 109-121, January.
  14. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
  15. Sophie Claeys & Christa Hainz, 2006. "Foreign Banks in Eastern Europe: Mode of Entry and Effects on Bank Interest Rates," Chapters,in: Financial Development, Integration and Stability, chapter 17 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  16. Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C., 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 135-167, April.
  17. Boes, Dieter, "undated". "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Discussion Paper Serie A 593, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Apr 1999.
  18. Berger, Allen N & Frame, W Scott & Miller, Nathan H, 2005. "Credit Scoring and the Availability, Price, and Risk of Small Business Credit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(2), pages 191-222, April.
  19. Helmut Bester, 2009. "Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 269-296.
  20. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1159-1187.
  21. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 349-384.
  22. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  23. repec:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1008684225781 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, pages 267-343.
  25. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
  26. repec:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:89-113 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Besanko, David & Tong, Jian & Wu, Jianjun, 2016. "Dynamic game under ambiguity: the sequential bargaining example, and a new "coase conjecture"," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1606, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.