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A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information

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  • Ausubel, Lawrence M.
  • Deneckere, Raymond J.

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  • Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Deneckere, Raymond J., 1989. "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 18-46, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:18-46
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    Cited by:

    1. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 137, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C., 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 135-167, April.
    3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, April.
    4. Helmut Bester, 2009. "Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 269-296, November.
    5. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    6. Gerardi, Dino & Hörner, Johannes & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "The role of commitment in bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 578-603.
    7. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1997. "Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 425-437, April.
    8. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 231-249, July.
    9. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, September.
    10. Bos, Dieter, 1999. "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 353-371, September.
    11. Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 2011. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 887-924, September.
    12. Schweinzer, Paul, 2010. "Sequential bargaining with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 109-121, January.
    13. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
    14. repec:spr:joecth:v:65:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-016-1004-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Boes, Dieter, "undated". "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Discussion Paper Serie A 593, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Apr 1999.
    16. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    17. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
    18. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    19. repec:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1008684225781 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
    21. repec:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:89-113 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Besanko, David & Tong, Jian & Wu, Jianjun, 2016. "Dynamic game under ambiguity: the sequential bargaining example, and a new "coase conjecture"," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1606, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

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