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Bribing and signaling in second price auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander & Treuren, Leonard, 2020. "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  2. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Working Papers 734, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  3. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
  4. Xiaoshuai Fan & Ying‐Ju Chen & Christopher S. Tang, 2021. "To Bribe or Not in a Procurement Auction under Disparate Corruption Pressure," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(5), pages 1220-1245, May.
  5. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2009. "Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 153-158, April.
  6. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
  7. Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
  8. Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2008. "Controlling collusion in auctions: The role of ceilings and reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 240-246, March.
  9. Deng, Shanglyu, 2023. "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  10. Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2021. "Bribing in team contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-9.
  11. Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "Bribe-proof rules in the division problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 331-343, November.
  12. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
  13. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
  14. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
  15. Kivetz, Gil & Tauman, Yair, 2010. "Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 138-149, May.
  16. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
  17. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Bidding collusion without passive updating," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-77.
  18. Ryoga Doi, 2025. "Assistance-proofness," Discussion Paper Series DP2025-12, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  19. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection," Working Papers 1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  20. Maria M. Wihardja, 2010. "Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions: Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, And Empirical Study," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 35(1), pages 35-57, March.
  21. Yunjian Xu & Katrina Ligett, 2018. "Commitment in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(2), pages 449-489, August.
  22. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Klijn, Flip & Sanchez, Estela, 2004. "Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 295-312, May.
  23. Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum," Scholarly Articles 10591649, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
  24. Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021. "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 536-557, June.
  25. John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021. "Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 662-690, September.
  26. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2007. "Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices," Discussion Papers 07-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  27. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
  28. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.
  29. Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Zongwei & Riis, Christian, 2021. "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-14.
  30. McAdams, David, 2015. "On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 959-972.
  31. Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat, 2018. "Collusion through communication in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-108.
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