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Essentially stable matchings

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ryo Shirakawa, 2022. "Coordinated Strategic Manipulations and Mechanisms in School Choice," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-25, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  2. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
  3. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024. "School choice with transferable student characteristics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
  4. Troyan, Peter, 2024. "(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
  5. Xiang Han & Junxiao Zhang, 2025. "Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(2), pages 497-517, March.
  6. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "School Choice with Multiple Priorities," Papers 2308.04780, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  7. Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice," Cahiers de recherche 2020-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  8. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2023. "Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
  9. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
  10. Li Chen, 2023. "Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 803-820, August.
  11. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Inácio Bó & Bertan Turhan, 2023. "Assignment maximization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 123-138, February.
  12. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2021. "Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 474-498.
  13. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2023. "Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts," Working Papers 257, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  14. Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  15. Kang Rong & Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2024. "The core of school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 783-800, May.
  16. Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2024. "School Choice with Consent: an Experiment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1760-1805.
  17. Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
  18. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Pepa Risma, Eliana, 2025. "Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 70-81.
  19. Zhang, Luosai, 2025. "The properness of weak stability notions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
  20. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  21. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
  22. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Beatriz Millan & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2025. "Obvious Manipulations, Stability, and Efficiency in Matching Markets with No, Unitary, and Multiple Contracts: Three Different Results," Working Papers 363, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  23. Doğan, Battal & Erdil, Aytek, 2025. "Widening access in university admissions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  24. Romm, Assaf & Roth, Alvin E. & Shorrer, Ran I., 2024. "Stability vs. no justified envy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 357-366.
  25. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 971-987, December.
  26. Clayton Thomas, 2024. "Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive," Papers 2404.02142, arXiv.org.
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