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Forward induction in coordination games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Pedro Dal Bo & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2010. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2205-2229, December.
  2. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
  3. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 2000. "Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-36, CIRANO.
  4. Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 91-119, April.
  5. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.
  6. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner G³th & Hartmut Kliemt, 2005. "Conventions: Some Conventional and Some Not So Conventional Wisdom," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 22, pages 147-168.
  7. Yavas, Abdullah, 2001. "The immediacy service of the specialist as a coordination mechanism," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 205-221, July.
  8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Köhlin, Gunnar & Martinsson, Peter & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2016. "Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 31-50.
  9. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2005. "Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 109-127, April.
  10. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Lorini, Emiliano & Moisan, Frédéric, 2016. "Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 86-106.
  11. Choi, S & Goyal, S. & Moisan, F., 2019. "Connectors and Influencers," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1935, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  12. Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2003. "Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation," Economics Working Papers 703, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  13. Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2007. "Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 183-209, October.
  14. Subhasish Dugar & Quazi Shahriar, 2012. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Relative Label Salience," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(3), pages 954-975, January.
  15. Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Endogenous outside options in coordination games: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 221-236, February.
  16. Julian Jamison, 2020. "Valuable Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-14, August.
  17. Michal Krol & Magdalena Ewa Krol, 2020. "On the strategic value of ‘shooting yourself in the foot’: an experimental study of burning money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 23-45, March.
  18. Colman, Andrew M. & Stirk, Jonathan A., 1998. "Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 279-293, April.
  19. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Post-Print halshs-00144901, HAL.
  20. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
  21. Anke Gerber, "undated". "Learning in and about Games," IEW - Working Papers 234, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  22. Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A., 1995. "Limitations of dominance and forward induction: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 391-395, October.
  24. M. Punniyamoorthy & Sarin Abraham & Jose Joy Thoppan, 2023. "A Method to Select Best Among Multi-Nash Equilibria," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 11(1), pages 101-127, April.
  25. A. Arrighetti & S. Curatolo, 2010. "Costi di coordinamento e vantaggi di aggregazione: esiti, morfologia e processi di interazione in un mondo artificiale multi-agente," Economics Department Working Papers 2010-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
  26. Thomas Neumann & Bodo Vogt, 2009. "Do Players’ Beliefs or Risk Attitudes Determine The Equilibrium Selections in 2x2 Coordination Games?," FEMM Working Papers 09024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  27. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia, 2002. "Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-205, May.
  28. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
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