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On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian, 2022. "Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders," Papers 2202.06479, arXiv.org.
  2. Quan Li & Kang Rong, 2024. "Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 525-545, June.
  3. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
  4. Renou, Ludovic & Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 16801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet & Renou, Ludovic, 2024. "Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  6. Natalie Collina & Surbhi Goel & Aaron Roth & Emily Ryu & Mirah Shi, 2025. "Emergent Alignment via Competition," Papers 2509.15090, arXiv.org.
  7. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  8. Pak Hung Au & Keiichi Kawai, 2021. "Competitive disclosure of correlated information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 767-799, October.
  9. Keskiner, Hilal & Gür, Bekir S., 2023. "Questioning merit-based scholarships at nonprofit private universities: Lessons from Turkey," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
  10. Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç & Samsonov, Arseniy, 2025. "Information agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
  11. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
  12. Ichihashi, Shota, 2019. "Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
  13. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
  14. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  15. Kitano, Wataru, 2025. "Information quality in sequential persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
  16. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  17. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
  18. Teddy Mekonnen & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2024. "Competition, Persuasion, and Search," Papers 2411.11183, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
  19. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
  20. Raphael Boleslavsky & Silvana Krasteva, 2025. "Limits of Disclosure in Search Markets," Papers 2506.06319, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2025.
  21. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
  22. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
  23. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  24. Niloufar Mirzavand Boroujeni & Krishnamurthy Iyer & William L. Cooper, 2025. "Decentralized Signaling Mechanisms," Papers 2504.14163, arXiv.org.
  25. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
  26. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
  27. Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023. "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-89.
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