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The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Emilson C.D. Silva & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2018. "Overlapping Climate Clubs under Transaction Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 7319, CESifo.
  2. Chander, Parkash & Wooders, Myrna, 2020. "Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  3. Csercsik, Dávid & Hubert, Franz & Sziklai, Balázs R. & Kóczy, László Á., 2019. "Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 355-365.
  4. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
  5. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
  6. Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
  7. Jan Kersting & Vicki Duscha & Matthias Weitzel, 2017. "Cooperation on Climate Change under Economic Linkages: How the Inclusion of Macroeconomic Effects Affects Stability of a Global Climate Coalition," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
  8. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2020. "On the $$\gamma $$γ-core of asymmetric aggregative games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(4), pages 493-504, May.
  9. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September.
  10. Kumoi, Yuki & Matsubayashi, Nobuo, 2014. "Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: Stability and fair profit allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 221-232.
  11. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2018. "On the gamma-core of asymmetric aggregative games," MPRA Paper 88722, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. BRECHET, Thierry & GERARD, François & TULKENS, Henry, 2007. "Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  14. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
  15. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 241-257, September.
  16. Chander, Parkash, 2017. "Subgame-perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 173-188.
  17. Crettez, Bertrand & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2022. "On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 61-68.
  18. Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  19. Parkash Chander, 2020. "Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 953-973, December.
  20. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2016. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 785-815, October.
  21. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2009. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 455-492, June.
  22. Reddy, Puduru V. & Zaccour, Georges, 2016. "A friendly computable characteristic function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 18-25.
  23. Bjart Holtsmark, 2013. "International cooperation on climate change: why is there so little progress?," Chapters, in: Roger Fouquet (ed.), Handbook on Energy and Climate Change, chapter 13, pages 327-343, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  24. Bertrand Crettez & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2023. "On the strong $$\beta$$ β -hybrid solution of an N-person game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 363-377, April.
  25. Calvo, Emilio & Rubio, Santiago J., 2013. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 6(4), pages 289-339, April.
  26. Elena Parilina & Leon Petrosyan, 2020. "On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-14, July.
  27. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2015. "International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 527-546, August.
  28. Piergiuseppe Pezzoli & Johannes Emmerling & Massimo Tavoni, 2023. "SRM on the table: the role of geoengineering for the stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 176(10), pages 1-21, October.
  29. Rabia Nessah & Kristiaan Kerstens, 2008. "Characterizations of the Existence of Nash Equilibria with Non-convex Strategy Sets," Working Papers 2008-ECO-13, IESEG School of Management.
  30. Johannes Emmerling & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Kai Lessmann, 2021. "Climate thresholds and heterogeneous regions: Implications for coalition formation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 293-316, April.
  31. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2011. "The kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and beyond: an economic and game theoretical exploration and interpretation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2011051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  32. Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2010. "International emissions trading with endogenous taxes," Discussion Papers 626, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
  33. Bertrand Crettez & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2023. "On The Strong Β-Hybrid Solution Of An N-Person Game," Post-Print hal-04204632, HAL.
  34. Zahur, Nahim Bin, 2014. "Farsighted Fuzzy Coalitions in an Economy with Multilateral Negative Externalities," 2014 Conference (58th), February 4-7, 2014, Port Macquarie, Australia 165807, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  35. Dritan Osmani, "undated". "A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption," Working Papers FNU-176, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.
  36. Anna Rettieva, 2020. "Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(9), pages 1-16, September.
  37. Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak, 2011. "Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?," MPRA Paper 34303, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2021. "On the core of economies with multilateral environmental externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 158-171, February.
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