Delegating management to experts

Citations

Cited by:

1. Martimort, David & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Krahmer Daniel & Strausz Roland, 2008. "Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, October.
3. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
4. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01156552, HAL.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Post-Print halshs-01156552, HAL.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01156552, HAL.
5. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2015. "Sequential screening with privately known characteristics of cost distribution," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201502, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
6. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2016. "Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 64-68.
7. Conlin, Michael & Orsini, Joe & Tang, Meng-Chi, 2013. "The effect of an agent’s expertise on National Football League contract structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 275-281.
8. Szalay, Dezsö, 2009. "Contracts with endogenous information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 586-625, March.
   • Dezsö SZALAY, 2004. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 04.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
   • Szalay, Dezso, 2006. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," Economic Research Papers 269750, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
   • Dezso Szalay, 2006. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 780, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
9. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2014. "Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 485-496.
   • Masaki Aoyagi, 2012. "Strategic Obscurity in the Forecasting of Disasters," ISER Discussion Paper 0832r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2014.
10. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-125, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
11. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 317-328.
    • Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus Static Screening: an Equivalence Result," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 24, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
12. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2012. "Informing consumers about their own preferences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 417-428.
    • Peitz, Martin & Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Informing Consumers about their own Preferences," Working Papers 12-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
13. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    • Kovác, Eugen & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Optimal Sequential Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 427, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
14. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 303, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
15. Boaz Zik, 2023. "Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 567-590, February.
16. Patrick Bajari & Christina Dalton & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2014. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 747-763, December.
17. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2016. "Sequential screening and the relationship between principal's preferences and agent's incentives," SERIES 01-2016, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2016.
18. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
    • David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson & Johnson Graduate School of Management & Cornell University, 2004. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," Economics Series Working Papers 185, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
19. Chifeng Dai, 2021. "Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 92-125, February.
20. Goodall, Amanda H. & Kahn, Lawrence M. & Oswald, Andrew J., 2011. "Why do leaders matter? A study of expert knowledge in a superstar setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 265-284, March.
21. Goodall, Amanda H. & Kahn, Lawrence M. & Oswald, Andrew J., 2008. "Why Do Leaders Matter? The Role of Expert Knowledge," IZA Discussion Papers 3583, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
22. Chifeng Dai, 2008. "Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 75-85, August.
23. Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.
24. Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
    • Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Working Papers 2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
25. Leon Yang Chu & David E. M. Sappington, 2010. "Contracting with private knowledge of signal quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 244-269, June.
26. Yaron Yehezkel, 2014. "Motivating a Supplier to Test Product Quality," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 309-345, June.