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Imperfect Information and Credible Communication

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Foerster, Manuel & Habermacher, Daniel, 2025. "Policy-advising competition and endogenous lobbies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 245(C).
  2. Suzanne H. Bijkerk & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Otto H. Swank, 2013. "Aggressive Reporting and Probabilistic Auditing in a Principles-Based Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-131/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Frug, Alexander, 2016. "A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
  4. Minkwan Ahn & Michael Drake & Hangsoo Kyung & Han Stice, 2019. "The role of the business press in the pricing of analysts’ recommendation revisions," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 341-392, March.
  5. Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
  6. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2007. "Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(5), pages 885-913, December.
  7. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  8. Bertomeu, Jeremy & Magee, Robert P., 2015. "Mandatory disclosure and asymmetry in financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 284-299.
  9. Qi Chen & Tracy R. Lewis & Katherine Schipper & Yun Zhang, 2017. "Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination Role," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 153-196, March.
  10. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  11. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
  12. Ichihashi, Shota, 2019. "Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
  13. Chakraborty, Archishman & Harbaugh, Rick, 2007. "Comparative cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 70-94, January.
    • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2004. "Comparative Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2004-08, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  14. Ramnath, Sundaresh & Rock, Steve & Shane, Philip, 2008. "The financial analyst forecasting literature: A taxonomy with suggestions for further research," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 34-75.
  15. Hertel, Jo & Smith, John, 2009. "Not so cheap talk: a model of advice with communication costs," MPRA Paper 17056, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
  17. Fang-Yi Chiou & Silje SL Hermansen & Bjørn Høyland, 2020. "Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 233-254, June.
  18. Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 153-160.
  19. Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2024. "Cheap talk with two-sided private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 97-118.
  20. Thakor, Anjan V., 2015. "Strategic information disclosure when there is fundamental disagreement," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 131-153.
  21. Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013. "Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
  22. Nicole L. Cade & Lisa Koonce & Kim I. Mendoza, 2020. "Using video to disclose forward-looking information: the effect of nonverbal cues on investors’ judgments," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1444-1474, December.
  23. Dobler, Michael, 2008. "Incentives for risk reporting -- A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 184-206.
  24. Manuel Foerster & Daniel Habermacher, 2025. "Authority, Communication, and Internal Markets," Working Papers 361, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  25. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Information Aggregation in Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Working Papers 169, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  26. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
  27. , & , J. & ,, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
  28. Jeremy Bertomeu & Edwige Cheynel & Davide Cianciaruso, 2021. "Strategic Withholding and Imprecision in Asset Measurement," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(5), pages 1523-1571, December.
  29. Tao Li, 2007. "The Messenger Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 489-501, October.
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