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Disclosure to a Psychological Audience

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Xingyi Liu, 2018. "Disclosing information to a loss-averse audience," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 63-79, April.
  2. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 0. "News media as suppliers of narratives (and information)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  3. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2024. "News Media as Suppliers of Narratives (and Information)," Papers 2403.09155, arXiv.org.
  4. Wei, Dong, 2021. "Persuasion under costly learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  5. Khan, M. Ali & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2024. "On comparisons of information structures with infinite states," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  6. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2022. "Selective memory of a psychological agent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
  7. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
  8. Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018. "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers pme809, Job Market Papers.
  9. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  10. Robertson, Matthew J., 2018. "Wrongful Conviction, Persuasion and Loss Aversion," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 48, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  11. Vohra, Akhil & Toikka, Juuso & Vohra, Rakesh, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion: Reduced form approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  12. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2024. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(1), pages 151-166, January.
  13. Neligh, Nathaniel, 2024. "Rational memory with decay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 120-145.
  14. Vaissman Guinsburg, Pedro, 2020. "Information Design and Sensitivity to Market Fundamentals," MPRA Paper 101496, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Jun 2020.
  15. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
  16. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Sternal, Philipp, 2025. "The motivated memory of noise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 257-275.
  17. Meng, Delong & Wang, Siyu, 2024. "Impact of open-mindedness on information avoidance: Tailored vs. generic communication," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  18. Juuso Toikka & Akhil Vohra & Rakesh Vohra, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  19. Anastasia Burkovskaya & Jian Li, 2024. "Comparative Statics of Disclosure Statements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1410-1427, March.
  20. Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2023. "Information Nudges and Self-Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2182-2197, April.
  21. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.
  22. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2024. "Monotone Function Intervals: Theory and Applications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2239-2270, August.
  23. M. Ali Khan & Haomiao Yu & Zhixiang Zhang, 2019. "Information Structures on a General State Space: An Equivalence Theorem and an Application," Working Papers 076, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
  24. Jetlir Duraj & Kevin He, 2019. "Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News," Papers 1908.00084, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  25. Victor Augias & Daniel M. A. Barreto, 2020. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," Papers 2011.13846, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
  26. Alexander M. Jakobsen, 2021. "An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2081-2116, September.
  27. Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  28. Yunus C. Aybas & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Persuasion with Coarse Communication," Papers 1910.13547, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2026.
  29. Daniele Pennesi, 2020. "Identity and information acquisition," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 610, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2021.
  30. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Nachbar, John, 2025. "Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
  31. Xu Jiang & Ying Xue, 2023. "Morale, performance and disclosure," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 5-23, February.
  32. Burkovskaya, Anastasia & Li, Jian, 2020. "Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements," ISU General Staff Papers 202002040800001095, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  33. Lane, Tom, 2022. "Intrinsic preferences for unhappy news," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 119-130.
  34. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
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