Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails
Citations
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Cited by:
- Mert Kimya, 2024. "Power, Status and the Stability of Hierarchies," Working Papers 2024-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.
- Zhu, Weichao & Wang, Lu & Lang, Youze, 2022. "The costs and benefits of tournament in a frictional labor market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
- Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
- Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2024. "Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Emre Ozdenoren & Murat Erkurt, 2026. "Distribution-Free Equilibrium in Search Contests," Papers 2603.20683, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
- Siyuan Fan & Zhonghong Kuang & Jingfeng Lu, 2026. "Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design," Papers 2602.21564, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2026.
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2025.
"Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 387-413, September.
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers w0278, New Economic School (NES).
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2021. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers wp2021_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Sela, Aner, 2025.
"Status classification by lottery contests,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
- Aner Sela, 2022. "Status Classification By Lottery Contests," Working Papers 2206, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Doron Klunover, 2020. "Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations," Papers 2007.04435, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
- Deng, Xiaotie & Gafni, Yotam & Lavi, Ron & Lin, Tao & Ling, Hongyi, 2025. "From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 268-293.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023.
"Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2020. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," Diskussionsschriften dp2011, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023. "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 180-199.
- Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
- Song, Jian & Houser, Daniel, 2023.
"Asymmetric shocks in contests: Theory and experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 243-267.
- Daniel Houser & Jian Song, 2021. "Asymmetric Shocks in Contests: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 1081, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Liu, Yiran & Yu, Yang, 2025. "Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-23.
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019.
"The shape of luck and competition in tournaments,"
Working Papers
w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).
- Andrzej Baranski & Sumit Goel, 2024. "The effect of competition in contests: A unifying approach," Papers 2410.04970, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
- Nicolas de Roos & Alexander Matros & Vladimir Smirnov, 2024. "Elimination tournaments with resource constraints," Working Papers 2024-06, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024. "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers 2409, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Choi, Heeick & Karim, Khondkar & Liu, Yin, 2025. "Tournament incentives, corporate overinvestment, and economic consequences," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
- Mengxi Zhang, 2023. "Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_156v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Yang, Siqiang & Zhu, Feng, 2025. "All-pay contests with unordered cost asymmetry: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
- Yildirim, Mustafa, 2023. "When does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
- Annie Liang & Jay Lu, 2026. "Creative Ownership in the Age of AI," Papers 2602.12270, arXiv.org.
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