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Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen

Author

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  • Gretschko, Vitali
  • Wambach, Achim

Abstract

Die Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) veröffentlichte am 21. Juni 2021 ein Szenarienpapier, das sich mit Grundsätzen der zukünftigen Bereitstellung von Mobilfunkfrequenzen mit einem besonderen Fokus auf die Verbesserung der Breitbandversorgung befasst. Das ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim nimmt als unabhängiges Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut dazu Stellung. Der Schwerpunkt der Stellungnahme ist die Ausgestaltung künftiger Vergabeverfahren und die Integration von Zielen der Breitbandversorgung in diese Verfahren.

Suggested Citation

  • Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2021. "Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen," ZEW Expert Briefs 21-07, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewexb:2107
    Note: Stellungnahme des ZEW Mannheim im Rahmen der öffentlichen Konsultation der Bundesnetzagentur
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Paul Milgrom, 2019. "Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 383-405, August.
    5. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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