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Anmerkungen zum Monopson am Arbeitsmarkt II

Author

Listed:
  • Sell, Friedrich L.
  • Ruf, Ernst K.

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht für den Fall eines sowie für den Fall zweier variabler Produktionsfaktoren, wie sich Mindestlöhne im nicht diskriminierenden Monopson auf Beschäftigung bzw. Kapitalintensität auswirken. Dabei kann der Mindestlohn in Höhe des hypothetischen Konkurrenzlohns oder in Höhe der Grenzkosten der Arbeit oder schließlich noch darüber liegen. Von besonderem Interesse ist die Situation mit zwei variablen Produktionsfaktoren: Es stellt sich eine nicht-lineare Budgetrestriktion ein und es können - neben der 'reinen Monopsonlösung' - drei weitere mögliche Betriebsoptima bestimmt werden. Alle vier Lösungen werden unter Verwendung einer Cobb-Douglas-Produktionsfunktion numerisch exakt bestimmt. Anschließend wird die theoretische Analyse noch verfeinert, indem eine CES-Produktionsfunktion unterstellt wird. Auch hier existiert eine exakte Lösung für das Monopson. In der Regel lassen sich aber die Lösungsbedingungen nur implizit und über geeignete Näherungsverfahren bestimmen. Es wird gezeigt, wie hoch ein Mindestlohn ausfallen muss, damit die vom Monopsonisten gewählte Kapitalintensität höher ausfällt als diejenige, die er im unreglementierten Monopson wählt. Schließlich wird in einer Sensitivitätsanalyse gezeigt, wie stark sich die Variation des Parameters μ aus der CES-Funktion auf die Optimallösung beim Monopson auswirkt. Für die wirtschaftspolitische Diskussion um das Für und Wider von Mindestlöhnen zeigt sich, dass Mindestlöhne tendenziell existierende Monopsone auf dem Arbeitsmarkt stabilisieren, dass für die Abschätzung der Beschäftigungseffekte von Mindestlöhnen keine Aussagen ohne Kenntnis der Substitutionselastizitäten möglich sind, und dass es von der Höhe des gewählten Mindestlohns letztlich abhängt, ob ein Monopsonist am Arbeitsmarkt seine bisherige Kapitalintensität beibehält, senkt oder sogar erhöht. Darüber hinaus wäre zu prüfen, ob die ins Feld geführten Beschäftigungsvorteile des Mindestlohns bei Vorliegen eines Monopsons sich nicht besser mit marktgerechten Instrumenten (Besteuerung des Monopsonisten und/oder Subventionierung des Arbeitsangebots) erreichen lassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Sell, Friedrich L. & Ruf, Ernst K., 2014. "Anmerkungen zum Monopson am Arbeitsmarkt II," Working Papers in Economics 2014,1, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20141
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierre Cahuc & Guy Laroque, 2014. "Optimal Taxation and Monopsonistic Labor Market: Does Monopsony Justify the Minimum Wage?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pages 259-273, April.
    2. Barr, Tavis & Roy, Udayan, 2008. "The effect of labor market monopsony on economic growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1446-1467, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbeitsmarkt; Monopson; Subsitutionselastizität; labor market; monopsony; elasticity of substitution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy

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