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Bürgerversicherung: Die Wirkung von Kopfprämien auf den Arbeitsmarkt

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  • Farhauer, Oliver
  • Borchardt, Katja
  • Stargardt, Tom

Abstract

In der öffentlichen Diskussion um die Einführung einer Bürgerversicherung zur Reform der Finanzierung der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung werden häufiger Modelle mit Kopfpauschalen oder Kopfprämien diskutiert. Dabei sind verschiedene Herangehensweisen bei der Ermittlung der Höhe der Prämien und der Ausgestaltung der Versicherungspflicht möglich. Diese Arbeit soll mit Hilfe der Mikroökonomie und im Rahmen eines einfachen Queru - Modells die Auswirkungen eines solchen Schrittes auf den Arbeitsmarkt aufzeigen. Des weiteren werden mögliche Konzepte für die Behandlung der bisher mitversicherten Kinder, sowie eine Umgestaltung des Familienlastenausgleichs thematisiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Farhauer, Oliver & Borchardt, Katja & Stargardt, Tom, 2004. "Bürgerversicherung: Die Wirkung von Kopfprämien auf den Arbeitsmarkt," Discussion Papers 2004/8, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tubsem:20048
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Breyer, Friedrich & Franz, Wolfgang & Homburg, Stefan & Schnabel, Reinhold & Wille, Eberhard, 2004. "Reform der sozialen Sicherung: Kurzfassung," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 92399.
    4. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Feil, Michael & Klinger, Sabine & Zika, Gerd, 2006. "Sozialabgaben und Beschäftigung : Simulationen mit drei makroökonomischen Modellen," IAB-Discussion Paper 200622, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    2. Kallweit Manuel & Kohlmeier Anabell, 2014. "Zusatzbeiträge in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung / Income-independent Surcharges in German Statutory Health Insurance: Weiterentwicklungsoptionen und ihre finanziellen sowie allokativen Effekte ," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 234(4), pages 490-517, August.

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