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Medical Savings Accounts als Instrument zur Reduktion von moral hazard Verlusten bei der Absicherung des Krankheitsrisikos

  • Schreyögg, Jonas

Krankenversicherungssysteme induzieren häufig Wohlfahrtsverluste aufgrund asymetrischer Informationen. Neben einem Anstieg der Gesundheitsausgaben bewirken diese eine ineffiziente Allokation von Ressourcen. Einige empirische Studien schätzen den Wohlfahrtsverlust sogar so gross, dass er den aus dem Pooling von Risiken resultierenden Nutzen einer Krankenversicherung überkompensiert. Da die Höhe des Wohlfahrtsverlustes von der Preiselastizität der Nachfrage abhängt, erscheint es sinnvoll, den Versicherungsumfang auf preisunelastische Gebiete der Nachfrage zu beschränken. Eine Differenzierung der Absicherung des Krankheitsrisikos nach der Preiselastizität verschiedener Nachfragebereiche könnte demnach die Wohlfahrtsverluste reduzieren. Singapur hat diesen Ansatz erfolgreich umgesetzt. Das dortige Finanzierungssystem setzt sich zusammen aus einer Hochrisikoversicherung, die unelastische Bereiche der Nachfrage abdeckt, out-of-pocket Zahlungen für elastische Bereiche und Gesundheitssparkonten (Medical Savings Accounts) für den Zwischenbereich.

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Paper provided by Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management in its series Discussion Papers with number 2002/5.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:tubsem:20025
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.wm.tu-berlin.de/menue/fakultaet_vii/

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  1. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-77, June.
  2. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
  3. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 1269, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Cassel, Dieter & Oberdieck, Veit, 2002. "Kapitaldeckung in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1998 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 82(1), pages 15-22.
  5. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 2001. "Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 289-293, March.
  6. William C. Hsiao, 2000. "What Should Macroeconomists Know About Health Care Policy: A Primer," IMF Working Papers 00/136, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Hurley, Jeremiah, 2000. "An overview of the normative economics of the health sector," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 55-118 Elsevier.
  8. Keeler, Emmett B. & Rolph, John E., 1988. "The demand for episodes of treatment in the health insurance experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 337-367, December.
  9. Feldman, Roger & Dowd, Bryan, 1991. "A New Estimate of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 297-301, March.
  10. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
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