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Politics as organized combat: New players and new rules of the game in Sweden

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  • Svallfors, Stefan

Abstract

As Hacker and Pierson (2010) have observed, politics is primarily organization: "organized combat." To understand the outcomes of politics, we have to look at how it is organized over time: by whom and with what resources? I take Sweden as an example of how politics as organized combat has changed quite dramatically in recent decades. Sweden is often cited as an opposite to the United States among the rich capitalist countries, but it has experienced many encompassing policy changes which have not received the attention they deserve. The paper specifies how Swedish organized politics has changed fundamentally, including the dismantling of corporatist arrangements, changes in the economic policy decision-making framework, increased income inequality, weakened political parties and changes in their social bases, the decline of blue-collar union strength, the growth of the policy professionals category, the increased impact of multilevel politics, and the mediatization of politics. Today's amorphous, invisible mode of elite-driven policy-making diverges greatly from the old corporatist structures and is accompanied by dramatically increasing inequality. Even in Sweden, the impact of money on politics has become stronger. The paper discusses what this implies for current politics and policy-making in Sweden.

Suggested Citation

  • Svallfors, Stefan, 2015. "Politics as organized combat: New players and new rules of the game in Sweden," MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:152
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    Cited by:

    1. Paster, Thomas, 2015. "Bringing power back in: A review of the literature on the role of business in welfare state politics," MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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