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Politics as organised combat – New players and new rules of the game in Sweden

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  • Stefan Svallfors

Abstract

In this paper, Sweden is used as an example of how organised politics has changed quite dramatically in the last couple of decades. The paper argues that there are a number of points that has recently changed Swedish organised politics in rather fundamental ways. These changes entail a new actor constellation in Swedish politics and policy-making, decreased visibility of political processes and the emergence of a strong feedback loop between inequality, participation and public policies. What this amounts to is a very different form of elite-driven policy-making than the old corporatist structures. An amorphous and quite invisible but still highly elite-driven process has emerged, in which inequality has increased dramatically, and the impact of money on politics has become stronger even in Sweden.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Svallfors, 2016. "Politics as organised combat – New players and new rules of the game in Sweden," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 505-519, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:21:y:2016:i:6:p:505-519
    DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1156662
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521118590.
    2. Haffert, Lukas & Mehrtens, Philip, 2013. "From austerity to expansion? Consolidation, budget surpluses, and the decline of fiscal capacity," MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/16, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521134132.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Viktor Skyrman, 2023. "An Antidote for Securitization? How Covered Bonds Fuel Household Indebtedness in Sweden’s Financialized Growth Model," Working Papers PKWP2314, Post Keynesian Economics Society (PKES).
    3. Sarah Perret, 2021. "Why were most wealth taxes abandoned and is this time different?," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3-4), pages 539-563, September.
    4. Zachrisson, Anna & Beland Lindahl, Karin, 2019. "Political opportunity and mobilization: The evolution of a Swedish mining-sceptical movement," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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