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Office versus Policy Motives in Portfolio Allocation: The Case of Junior Ministers

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  • Manow, Philip
  • Zorn, Hendrik

Abstract

Why junior ministers? What function do they serve? Two explanations dominate the literature. Both focus on the role of junior ministers in coalition formation and coalition management. One approach sees junior ministers as instruments for controlling policy, the other as a means to solve or ease distributive conflict among coalition partners. As of yet, the literature lacks a discussion about when the two interpretations lead to similar empirical predictions and when they lead to different ones. The paper claims that different patterns of portfolio distribution can inform us about the underlying policy or office motives of the partners of a coalition government. Analyzing a rich data set on 11 countries from 1949 to 2004, the paper identifies a group of countries in which portfolio allocation shared a pattern best explained by office-seeking behavior, whereas in another group of countries portfolio allocation is better explained as the result of policy-seeking behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Manow, Philip & Zorn, Hendrik, 2004. "Office versus Policy Motives in Portfolio Allocation: The Case of Junior Ministers," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/9, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:049
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schofield, Norman & Laver, Michael, 1985. "Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 143-164, April.
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    3. Golden, Miriam A., 2003. "Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 189-212, April.
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    5. Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, 2004. "Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 13-27, January.
    6. Laver, Michael & Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 873-890, September.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:02:p:453-469_14 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ganghof, Steffen, 2004. "Wer regiert in der Steuerpolitik? Einkommensteuerreform zwischen internationalem Wettbewerb und nationalen Verteilungskonflikten," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 50, number 50.
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    1. Ganghof, Steffen & Manow, Philip, 2005. "Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 54, number 54.

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