Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of internet traffic quality regulation
In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traffic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on minimum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insensitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities.
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- Weiß, Hans-Jörg, 2010. "Markt und Staat in der Verkehrswirtschaft," Discussion Papers 134, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
- G. Knieps, 2005. "Telecommunications Markets in the Stranglehold of EU Regulation: On the need for a disaggregated regulatory contract," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 6(2), pages 75-94, June.
- Knieps, Günther, 2010. "Regulatory reforms of European network industries and the courts," Discussion Papers 129 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
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