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Zunehmende Konfliktregulierung durch Arbeitsgerichte? Eine ökonomische Analyse der Häufigkeit von Kündigungsschutzprozessen

Author

Listed:
  • Frick, Bernd
  • Schneider, Martin

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag argumentiert, daß die regionale Arbeitsmarktsituation (Zugänge in Arbeitslosigkeit und Zugänge an freien Stellen) die Entscheidung von Arbeitnehmern, eine Kündigungsschutzklage einzureichen, deutlich beeinflußt. Regressionsanalysen mit amtlichen Daten für die westlichen Bundesländer im Zeitraum 1964-1996 zeigen in Abweichung von früheren Befunden (Falke et al. 1981), daß die Häufigkeit von Kündigungsschutzprozessen deutlich und signifikant mit Unterschieden in der regionalen Arbeitsmarktsituation und mit deren zeitlichen Veränderungen erklärt werden kann. Die Modellschätzungen zeigen außerdem, daß das autonome Niveau der relativen Klagehäufigkeit, das nicht auf die Arbeitsmarktsituation zurückgeführt werden kann, im Beobachtungszeitraum gestiegen ist. Denkbare Ursachen dieser Klagenflut werden abschließend diskutiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Frick, Bernd & Schneider, Martin, 1999. "Zunehmende Konfliktregulierung durch Arbeitsgerichte? Eine ökonomische Analyse der Häufigkeit von Kündigungsschutzprozessen," Quint-Essenzen 56, University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community (IAAEG).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iaaegq:56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sarah Brown & Bernd Frick & John Sessions, 1997. "Unemployment, Vacancies and Unfair Dismissals," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 11(2), pages 329-349, June.
    2. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
    3. ., 1998. "Time," Chapters, in: John B. Davis & D. W. Hands & Uskali Mäki (ed.), The Handbook of Economic Methodology, chapter 124, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    1. Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2005. "Severance Pay and the Shadow of the Law: Evidence for West Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 541, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Berger, Helge & Neugart, Michael, 2011. "Labor courts, nomination bias, and unemployment in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 659-673.

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