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Implikationen der Verhaltensökonomik für die Wettbewerbspolitik

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  • Haucap, Justus

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  • Haucap, Justus, 2014. "Implikationen der Verhaltensökonomik für die Wettbewerbspolitik," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 65, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:65
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    1. Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy With Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead Of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule Of Reason”," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-244.
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