Legal and illegal cartels in Germany between 1958 and 2004
This paper offers a new and broad insight into the landscape of German cartels, utilizing a unique dataset of all illegal horizontal cartels detected by the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) between 1958 and 2004 and all legal cartels authorized during the same time period. We also provide the first comparison of legal and illegal cartels in Germany. Legal cartels tend to last longer and to have more members than illegal cartels, while there are little differences with respect to the industries involved. The construction industries are the most cartelized sectors in Germany (29.8% of all legal cartels, 43.2% of all illegal cartels) followed by manufacture of metals and machinery (21.9% of all legal cartels, 30.6% of all illegal cartels). How the number of cartel members affects the duration of cartels is ambiguous. Cartels with no more than 12 members tend to last longer than cartels with more than 12 members. However, cartels with 5 to 12 members also tend to last longer than cartels with less than 5 members.
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- Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
- Lauk Martina, 2003. "Ökonometrische Analyse der Entscheidungspraxis des Bundeskartellamtes / Econometric Analysis of the Decisions of the German Federal Cartel Office," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(6), pages 680-711, December.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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