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Rational actors in balancing markets: a game-theoretic model and results

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  • Rupp, Thomas

Abstract

Guided by game theory we develop a model to explain behavioral equilibria under uncertainty and interaction with the spot market on balancing markets. We offer some insights for the general model and derive explicit solutions for a specific model in which the error distributions and pricing function are given. The most interesting conclusions are the unique existence of an equilibrium and that no participant acts contrary to the aggregate market (either all market participants buy or sell power) and all strategies are, normalized properly, equal (which is rather counterintuitive). Furthermore the aggregate behavior is a stochastic process varying around its own variance.

Suggested Citation

  • Rupp, Thomas, 2006. "Rational actors in balancing markets: a game-theoretic model and results," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 171, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:darddp:dar_36753
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frank Wolak, 2000. "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 1-39.
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    3. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter.
    4. Bert Willems, 2004. "Cournot Competition, Financial Option markets and Efficiency," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0414, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; nash equilibrium; regulated energy market; balancing power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General

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