Strategic choice of stock pollution: Why conservatives (appear to) turn green
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, 2003. "Credible Carbon Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(3), pages 438-450.
- Fredriksson, Per G. & Wang, Le & Mamun, Khawaja A., 2011. "Are politicians office or policy motivated? The case of U.S. governors' environmental policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 241-253, September.
- van der Ploeg, Frederick & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "Too much coal, too little oil," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 62-77.
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KeywordsStock Pollution; Political Economy of Environmental Policy; Time Inconsistency; Strategic choice of stock variables; Sequential Game; Partisan Politicians; Ideological Preferences; Green Parties;
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-04-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2014-04-11 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2014-04-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GER-2014-04-11 (German Papers)
- NEP-POL-2014-04-11 (Positive Political Economics)
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