Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility at the Boundary of Genericity
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2026-09-28 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2026-09-28 (Microeconomics)
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