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Anticipation of Discrimination, Misperceptions, and Trust : Application to Affective Polarization

Author

Listed:
  • Rustagi, Devesh

    (University of Warwick)

  • Schief, Matthias

    (OECD)

Abstract

Does anticipation of discrimination, beliefs individuals have about the discriminatory behavior of others toward them, undermine trust and cooperation? We develop a new design to isolate the role of anticipation of discrimination in cooperation dilemmas using a trust game. We capture the effect of anticipation on trust as the double di erence between the amount transferred by trustors to outgroup vs. ingroup trustees when their own identity is revealed vs. concealed. We apply our design in the context of a ective polarization in the UK using a large representative sample. We nd that anticipation of discrimination undermines inter-partisan trust and cooperation by the same magnitude as the combined e ect of taste-based and statistical discrimination. However, this anticipation is misperceived because trustees rarely discriminate along partisan lines, resulting in cooperation failure. Our design can be used to study anticipation of discrimination across di erent societal divisions including gender, et hnicity, religion, and caste. JEL Codes: C91 ; C93 ; J15 ; D72 ; Z13

Suggested Citation

  • Rustagi, Devesh & Schief, Matthias, 2024. "Anticipation of Discrimination, Misperceptions, and Trust : Application to Affective Polarization," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1535, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1535
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gachter, 2010. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 541-556, March.
    2. Louis-Pierre Lepage & Xiaomeng Li & Basit Zafar, 2022. "Anticipated Gender Discrimination and Grade Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 30765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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