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Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality

Author

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  • Oliver Kirchkamp

    (Bonn University, Wirtschaftstheorie III, Adenauerallee 24, 53113 Bonn, Germany)

Abstract

We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are matched forever. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by their partners. Thus, several features of spatial evolution are captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can identify characteristics of evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run exploitation among different strategies. We further discuss evolution of repeated game strategies in this framework comparing synchronous models with asynchronous ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Kirchkamp, 1995. "Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality," Game Theory and Information 9510004, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9510004
    Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on NeXT; to print on PostScript; pages: 30; figures: included. The most current electronic version is available at http://witch.econ3.uni- bonn.de/~oliver/evolPair.shtml
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bryan Routledge, "undated". "Co-Evolution and Spatial Interactoin," GSIA Working Papers 1997-46, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    2. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
    3. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    4. Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-493, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary Game Theory; Networks;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies

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