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The Theory of Theft: An Inspection Game Model of the Stolen Base Play in Baseball

Author

Listed:
  • Theodore L. Turocy

    (Texas A&M)

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of equilibrium in mixed strategies in an inspection game model to describe the strategic interaction in the stolen base play in baseball. A parsimonious simultaneous-move game model offers predictions about how the observable conduct of the teams on offense and defense responds as the characteristics of the players involved change. The theory organizes observations from play-by-play data from Major League Baseball, where highly-motivated, experienced professionals interact in an environment where private information is not significant.

Suggested Citation

  • Theodore L. Turocy, 2004. "The Theory of Theft: An Inspection Game Model of the Stolen Base Play in Baseball," Game Theory and Information 0401005, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 May 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401005
    Note: Type of Document - ; prepared on Linux; pages: 18
    as

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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0401/0401005.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001. "Minimax Play at Wimbledon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December.
    2. P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Turocy, Theodore L., 2005. "Offensive performance, omitted variables, and the value of speed in baseball," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 283-286, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mixed strategy; Markov equilibrium; baseball;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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