Offensive Performance, Omitted Variables, and the Value of Speed in Baseball
This note considers the problem of estimating the marginal products of offensive events towards a baseball team's objective of scoring runs. Regression techniques on official statistics give a positive marginal product for a stolen base attempt, which is inconsistent with the theory of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Augmenting the specification of the production function to include other productive qualities of footspeed restores estimates consistent with equilibrium theory.
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- Theodore L. Turocy, 2004. "The Theory of Theft: An Inspection Game Model of the Stolen Base Play in Baseball," Game Theory and Information 0401005, EconWPA, revised 10 May 2005.
- Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001. "Minimax Play at Wimbledon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December.
- P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
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