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Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information

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  • Frédérique Bracoud

    (Keele University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes sequential games of double-sided Bertrand competition in the deposit and credit markets, when banks are free to reject customers and cannot distinguish among borrowers. The timing of competition is crucial when customers apply once. Interest rates are pushed upwards when the deposit market is the first to be visited, whereas rates are submitted to downward pressures otherwise. With multiple applications, the order of competition does not matter. Multiple applications in one market weaken competition in that market and generate outcomes similar to the case when this market is visited in a second stage in the single-application framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédérique Bracoud, 2002. "Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information 0211002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0211002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marie-Odile Yanelle, 1997. "Banking Competition and Market Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(2), pages 215-239.
    2. Daniel F. Spulber, 1996. "Market Microstructure and Intermediation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 135-152, Summer.
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    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    6. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
    7. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
    8. Santomero, Anthony M, 1984. "Modeling the Banking Firm: A Survey," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 576-602, November.
    9. Frederique Bracoud, 1999. "Bertrand Competition For Deposits And Loans Under Asymmetric Information: Stiglitz And Weiss Revisited," Working Papers 1999_01, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaoqiang Cheng & Patrick Van Cayseele, 2009. "State Aid and Competition in Banking: the Case of China in the Late Nineties," LICOS Discussion Papers 25009, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    2. Frederique Bracoud, 2007. "Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(7), pages 1-16.
    3. Timo Baas & Mechthild Schrooten, 2006. "‘Relationship Banking and SMEs: A Theoretical Analysis’," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 127-137, October.
    4. van den End, Jan Willem & Tabbae, Mostafa, 2012. "When liquidity risk becomes a systemic issue: Empirical evidence of bank behaviour," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 107-120.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:7:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial intermediation; Bertrand competition; Dual competition; Adverse selection; Credit rationing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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