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Value for Money? Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability in the Laboratory

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Abstract

Though vote-buying is observed in a diverse set of polities worldwide, relatively little is known about the channels through which it affects subsequent governance outcomes. Using laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya, we show that vote-buying reduces voters' willingness to punish politicians and increases rent-seeking by the incumbent politician. Specifically, we collect data from 816 subjects engaged in a simple voting game in which voters can punish a politician who expropriates rents from a common treasury. Voters who receive "a payment in exchange for your vote" increase the maximum amount they will allow the politician to expropriate while still voting to reelect him. Politicians, in turn, expropriate more when vote-buying is introduced. We provide evidence that social preferences, particularly reciprocity, are an important channel for this response.

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  • Jessica Leight & Rohini Pande & Laura Ralston, 2016. "Value for Money? Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability in the Laboratory," Department of Economics Working Papers 2016-15, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    • Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2016-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2002. "An Experimental Bribery Game," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 428-454, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; vote buying; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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