Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, "undated". "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
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More about this item
KeywordsJoint-Liability; Group-Lending; Credit-Cooperatives; Financial-Intermediation;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
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