Impact Of Regulated Price Adjustments On Price Variability In A Very Low Inflation Transition Economy: Case Of Armenia
The impact of macroeconomic management (monetary policy) and administrative price adjustments on price variability in a low inflation economy characterized by relatively frequent administrative price adjustments is examined. Fluctuations of market determined prices, prices of agricultural goods in particular, are linked to the lack of synchronization between administrative price changes and monetary policy. If monetary policy does not account for expected changes in administrative prices, demand in ???free??? goods markets will shift causing fluctuation of prices for agricultural goods, because the supply of these goods is highly inelastic in Armenia. The findings contribute to a better understanding of agricultural price variability during 1998-2002. The impact of macroeconomic policy and structural adjustments on income distribution and rural poverty incidence are also examined. This research has immediate policy implications since Armenia will undergo major upward price adjustments for goods and services with regulated prices, which may have a negative impact on income distribution if aggregate demand management is unchanged.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 724 E. University Ave, Wyly Hall 1st Flr, Ann Arbor MI 48109|
Phone: 734 763-5020
Fax: 734 763-5850
Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Witold J. Henisz & Edward D. Mansfield, 2015.
"Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 8, pages 145-167
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Witold J. Henisz & Edward D. Mansfield, 2004. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-712, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Henisz, Witold J. & Zelner, Bennet A., 2006. "Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 263-286, January.
- Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, 2004. "Interest Groups, Veto Points And Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-711, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2004-731. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (WDI)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.