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Using a Soft Deadline to Counter Monopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiro Yoshida

    (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)

Abstract

A monopolist often exploits a hard deadline to raise their commitment power. I explore whether a group of buyers can employ a soft deadline to counter the monopoly. Using a simple durable goods monopolist model under a deadline, I show that the buyers’ imperfect commitment to an earlier exit may elicit a compromise from the monopolist and generate the buyers’ premium. The soft deadline partially restores the self-competition dynamics of Coase conjecture, which is previously constrained by the hard deadline. Only one soft deadline breaks the conventional link between the time horizon (or durability of goods) and monopoly power.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiro Yoshida, 2023. "Using a Soft Deadline to Counter Monopoly," Working Papers 2305, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wap:wpaper:2305
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2002. "On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1477-1517, July.
    2. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
    4. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
    6. Simon Board & Marek Pycia, 2014. "Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 656-671, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; durable goods monopoly; commitment; Coase conjecture; dead-line effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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