Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals
This study uses a multiagent system to investigate English auctions with two-dimensional value signals and agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal.
|Date of creation:||19 Nov 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PO Box 1700, STN CSC, Victoria, BC, Canada, V8W 2Y2|
Web page: http://web.uvic.ca/econ
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2005.
"Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 155-170, April.
- Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2004. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Working Paper Series in Economics 7, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 442-460, June.
- Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
- Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 183-204, January.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2005. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 5-20, April.
- Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2001. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Sealed-Bid Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Department Discussion Papers 0707, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0708. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Graham Voss)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.