Tournaments, gift exchanges, and the effect of monetary incentives for teachers: the case of Chile
In this paper we evaluate the introduction of monetary incentives for teachers, based on a school performance tournament in Chile. We evaluate the tournament effect, i.e. the effect of introducing the incentive scheme on all participant schools: winners and losers. We also evaluate the effect of winning the tournament on next period school performance that we call the gift-exchange effect. Matching and Regression Discontinuity techniques are used to identify both treatment effects. The results indicate a positive and significant tournament effect and a positive but nonsignificant gift-exchange effect.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Federico Huneeus)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.