Tournaments, gift exchanges, and the effect of monetary incentives for teachers: the case of Chile
In this paper we evaluate the introduction of monetary incentives for teachers, based on a school performance tournament in Chile. We evaluate the tournament effect, i.e. the effect of introducing the incentive scheme on all participant schools: winners and losers. We also evaluate the effect of winning the tournament on next period school performance that we call the gift-exchange effect. Matching and Regression Discontinuity techniques are used to identify both treatment effects. The results indicate a positive and significant tournament effect and a positive but nonsignificant gift-exchange effect.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tatiana Reyes)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.