Entry and Exit Strategies in Migration Dynamics
This work is devoted to study the role of combined entry and exit strategies in the migration process. It develops a real option model in which the community of immigrants in the host country is described as a club and the immigrant’s benefits is a U-shaped function, depending on the dimension of the district. There exist two threshold levels: the first one triggers the migration choice, while the second triggers the return to the country of origin. The theoretical results show that the phenomenon of hysteresis is amplified by the existence of a community both in the entry case and in the exit case. Furthermore, the community can reduce the minimum wage level required to trigger both exit and entry: this fact could explain why in some cases we observe migration inflows with a low wage differential and also with underemployment. Finally, the paper shows some possible further extensions: in one case, by introducing heterogeneity among immigrants, it gives some intuitions about migration inflows with respect to different skill levels and, in another case, it shows some theoretical implementations to include policy shocks in the migrant’s choice.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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Web page: http://www.unibs.it/atp/page.1019.0.0.0.atp?node=224
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