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Optimal Timing of Self-Protective Investment

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  • Hulisi Ogut
  • Srinivasan Raghunathan
  • Ismail Saglam

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  • Hulisi Ogut & Srinivasan Raghunathan & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Optimal Timing of Self-Protective Investment," Working Papers 0816, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tob:wpaper:0816
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    File URL: http://ikt.web.etu.edu.tr/RePEc/pdf/0816.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    2. Dionne, G. & Harrigton, E.S., 1991. "An Introduction to Insurance Economics," Cahiers de recherche 9101, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    3. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    4. Ehrlich, Isaac, 2000. "Uncertain lifetime, life protection, and the value of life saving," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 341-367, May.
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