IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiutis/0c4eea76-6401-45ae-866c-a03391c089e4.html

What causes the strength-is-weakness effect in coalition formation : Passive adoption or active selection of self-serving allocation rules?

Author

Listed:
  • Wissink, Joeri

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • van Beest, Ilja

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Pronk, Tila

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • van de Ven, Niels

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Wissink, Joeri & van Beest, Ilja & Pronk, Tila & van de Ven, Niels, 2021. "What causes the strength-is-weakness effect in coalition formation : Passive adoption or active selection of self-serving allocation rules?," Other publications TiSEM 0c4eea76-6401-45ae-866c-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0c4eea76-6401-45ae-866c-a03391c089e4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstreams/72dc5e9a-e05f-4e78-8588-f0405249f102/download
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arthur J. H. C. Schram, 2008. "Experimental Public Choice," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 32, pages 579-591, Springer.
    2. Benoit Bediou & Klaus R Scherer, 2014. "Egocentric Fairness Perception: Emotional Reactions and Individual Differences in Overt Responses," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(2), pages 1-11, February.
    3. Hanna Bäck & Patrick Dumont, 2008. "Making the first move," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 353-373, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Majer, Johann M. & Engler, John-Oliver & Saxena, Emma & Mojzisch, Andreas, 2026. "Conflict frames in the wild: win-lose frames are more common, but mixed and win-win frames are more effective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    2. Wissink, Joeri & Cantiani, Anabela & Ven, Niels van de & Pronk, Tila & Erle, Thorsten M. & Beest, Ilja van, 2023. "Strength‐is‐weakness : The (ir)relevant relation between resources and payoffs in coalition formation," Other publications TiSEM 75683c21-0614-49c7-95a1-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wissink, Joeri & Beest, Ilja van & Pronk, Tila & Ven, Niels van de, 2022. "Strength is still a weakness in coalition formation : Replicating and understanding the Strength-is-Weakness effect," Other publications TiSEM 224b7385-ffb6-4bad-8b9f-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
    3. Gabriele Camera & Cary Deck & David Porter, 2016. "Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation?," Working Papers 16-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    4. Jun Hu, 2021. "Asymmetric punishment, Leniency and Harassment Bribes in China: a selective survey," Working Papers hal-03119491, HAL.
    5. Gabriele Camera & Cary Deck & David Porter, 2019. "Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation & Prosperity?," Working Papers 19-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    6. Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul & Vorster, Melissa, 2017. "The back-scratching game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 494-508.
    7. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Side-payments and the costs of conflict," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 278-286.
    8. Adam Ayaita & Kathleen Stürmer, 2020. "Risk aversion and the teaching profession: an analysis including different forms of risk aversion, different control groups, selection and socialization effects," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 4-25, January.
    9. David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.
    10. Kavya Sanjaya, 2018. "Decentralization and the Saga of Corruption," Shanlax International Journal of Economics, Shanlax Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 1-8, December.
    11. Bäck, Hanna & Lindvall, Johannes, 2015. "Commitment Problems in Coalitions: A New Look at the Fiscal Policies Of Multiparty Governments," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 53-72, January.
    12. Demiral, Elif E. & Mollerstrom, Johanna, 2020. "The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 341-352.
    13. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 378, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    14. Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
    15. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2021. "To Bribe or Not to Bribe? An Experimental Analysis of Corruption," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 7(3), pages 487-508, November.
    16. Jaekwon Suh, 2012. "Corporate governance under proportional electoral systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 671-690, March.
    17. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Papers in Economics 12884, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    18. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Goerg & Gaoneng Yu, 2012. "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2012_01, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, revised May 2013.
    19. Marc Debus & Jochen Müller & Peter Obert, 2011. "Europeanization and government formation in multi-level systems: Evidence from the Czech Republic," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 381-403, September.
    20. Jeannette Brosig-Koch & Werner Güth & Torsten Weiland, 2016. "Comparing the effectiveness of collusion devices in first-price procurement: an auction experiment," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 269-295, December.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0c4eea76-6401-45ae-866c-a03391c089e4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/about/schools/economics-and-management/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.