Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction
This paper examines the justifications, history, and practice of regulation in the US telecommunications sector. We examine the impact of technological and regulatory change on market structure and business strategy. Among others, we discuss the emergence and decline of the telecom bubble, the impact on pricing of digitization and the emergence of Internet telephony (VOIP). We also examine the impact of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on market structure and strategy in conjunction with the history of regulation and antitrust intervention in the telecommunications sector. After discussing the impact of wireless technologies, we conclude by venturing into some short term predictions. We express concern about the derailment of the implementation of the 1996 Act by the aggressive legal tactics of the entrenched monopolists (the local exchange carriers), and we point to the real danger that the intent of Congress in passing the 1996 Act to promote competition in telecommunications will never be realized in local telecommunications in the fashion that the 1996 prescribed. The decision of AT&T to stop marketing both long distance and local services to residential customers is a direct result of the derailing of the 1996 Act that has allowed the local service monopolists (i) to enter long distance while the local market was still monopolized; and (ii) to leverage their monopoly power in the local market to the long distance market. We also discuss the wave of mergers in the Telecommunications and cable industries, the telecom meltdown of 2000-2003, and issues that arose from the triennial review by the FCC of implementation of the 1996 Act.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126|
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nicholas Economides, 1997.
"The Economics of Networks,"
Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics,
Department of Economics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, vol. 1(0), December.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1996. "The economics of networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 673-699, October.
- Nicholas Economides, 1995. "The Economics of Networks," Working Papers 94-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, revised Sep 1995.
- Nicholas Economides, 1997. "The Economics of Networks," Industrial Organization 9701002, EconWPA.
- Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Working Papers 95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1997. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Industrial Organization 9701003, EconWPA.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1999. "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its impact1," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 455-483, December.
- Nicholas Economides, 1998. "The Telecommunication Act of 1996 and its Impact," Working Papers 98-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides, 1999. "Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network," Working Papers 99-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance," Industrial Organization 9612003, EconWPA.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:03-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Viveca Licata)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.