Decidability and manipulability in social choice
We present a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority enjoys a vast power of determining the social outcome, as locally or globally stable social optima can be created or eliminated. At the same time, by bundling and unbundling elements, it is also possible to greatly increase or decrease decidability both because the likelihood of intransitive cycles varies and because the time required to reach a social optimum varies. In this paper we present a rigorous framework which allows us to study this trade-off between decidability and non-manipulability.
|Date of creation:||03 Jul 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza dei Martiri della Liberta, 33, 56127 Pisa|
Web page: http://www.lem.sssup.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2011.
"The construction of choice: a computational voting model,"
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination,
Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 6(2), pages 139-156, November.
- Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2010. "The construction of choice. A computational voting model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3077-3087.
- Callander, Steven & Wilson, Catherine H., 2006. "Context-dependent Voting," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 227-254, July.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:02:p:435-445_24 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(2), pages 577-619.
- Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 12720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Mullainathan, Sendhil & Schwartzstein, Joshua, 2008. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," Scholarly Articles 11022284, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Luigi Marengo & Simona Settepanella, 2010. "Social choice among complex objects," LEM Papers Series 2010/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Luigi Maregno & Corrado Pasquali, 2008. "A computational voting model," LEM Papers Series 2008/24, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)